Iran, because of its size, population,
cultural identity, resources and its location as a
historical, geographic and an economic link between East and
West, in addition to bridging two vital centers of energy,
namely, the Caspian Sea and the Persian Gulf, assumes an
importance greater than ever before. Today, the overarching
significance of Oil in the global economy and the
concomitant rise of nationalism and religious particularism
has vividly added to Iran's importance not only as a passive
link, but as a key player and indeed instigator and arbiter
of events transpiring in the entire adjacent region. This
"adjacent" region stretches from the shores of the
Mediterranean to the semi deserts of Afghanistan, and
Baluchestan in Pakistan, to the towering peaks of the
Caucasus to the shores of the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean.
Iran in every sense of the word, is the center of this
varied moment< - -Moreover, few important decisions among
the regional states regarding political and economic
interests can be made without considering the interests and
reactions of Iran. From the foregoing, it is apparent that
Iran's geo-strategic location in the region places an
extra-ordinary prerequisite for adeptness and ability in
domestic and foreign affairs, on the shoulders of its
government leaders. Focus on Iran believes that the current
Iranian government fails miserably in that requirement.
This leadership's behavior in the past decade reflects the
cleric's inability and ineptness in dealing with the outside world
and addressing the needs of its people. The burden thus, placed on
the Iranian government is great and considering its inability and
incompetence, so is the impelling necessity of replacing it with a
government that is capable of meeting the present challenge and
the future needs of the nation. An essential factor bearing on the
reputation and effectiveness of any future Iranian government (as
well as for any other democratic government) is its credibility.
This credibility
must exist both in the minds of its people and the international
community. Since the clerics in Tehran, rule without the consent
and will of the Iranian people, therefore they lack that vital
quality and credibility. All these failures of the current
government of Iran, has contributed to its apparent irrational and
self-destructive behavior. In response to such short-sighted
policies, Iran's leadership has not only become a "pariah"
government in die global community but it is also mistrusted and
extremely unpopular in the eyes of the Iranian populace.
IRAN AS THE FOCAL POINT AND THE GEO-STRATEGIC CENTER OF
THE MIDDLE -EAST AND THE ADJACENT REGION
In order to appreciate Iran's critical and important
geo-strategic location as links between East and West (the
Middle East and South Asia), North and South (the
Caucasus-Central Asia and the Persian Gull) one only needs to
look at the accompanying schematic diagram with its reference
points (1-16) which are discussed in this issue. Perhaps, no
other country in the world finds itself surrounded by as many
nations and geographical points, bearing issues relevant to a
nation's domestic and external security and/or survival needs.
Reflecting on this geo-strategic reality, the imperative for a
superior and credible national leadership for Iran becomes even
more evident. Focus on Iran, will now illustrate this imperative
by highlighting the impact of each of these 16 reference points
on Iran's foreign and domestic security and national interests
and how the current regime has failed to address these issues
due to its incompetence, misunderstanding, lack of breath in
foreign affairs or in pursuing its narrow self-interest rather
than the national interest.
1- THE CASPIAN SEA:
The vital fishing industry on the southern beaches of the
Caspian Sea is threatened in short term, with pollution from the
Oil fields at Baku and others in the Western Caspian Sea and, in
long tern, pollution from the Volga and Ural rivers. The current
regime has not pressed for an environmental compact between
itself, Azarbaijan. Russia, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan. The
failure to do so will have significant economic consequences for
the nation in the future.
2-TURKMENISTAN:
Relations with this nation at present is good. In fact, a
railroad is planned to connect Ashkhabad with Mashad. The
obvious conclusion upon inspection is that Mashad will be
connected by Rail to Trans-Caspian Turkmenistan and by that
means to points further east in the former Central Asia
Republics. It would appear that the current regime hopes to reap
political benefits through this rail linkage. More to the point,
are the desired economic and strategic benefits, which are
purchased at a price the nation most likely cannot afford,
especially, the uncertain returns on this investment and the
economic needs of the populace. Focus on Iran believes the price
to be too high for the dubious future benefits.
3-AFGHANISTAN:
By its ineptness and lack of long range vision, the clerical
leadership has become involved in the "Afghan Quagmire", namely by
attempting to insinuate its influence in Kabul at the potential
cost of deteriorating relations with Pakistan and a large emigre
population of Afghans in the Khorasan province. The "Taleban" who
became an important factor in Afghanistan's policy in the last two
years, for political and strategic reasons, have been supported by
Pakistan. It would be more prudent and rational, if not more to
the nation's long term interests, if the ruling clerics remained
aloof from the political turmoil in Afghanistan till "the dust
settles."
4- PAKISTAN:
Relations with Pakistan which indeed as allies in CENTO in the
height of the Cold War, had been close and cordial for decades,
has significantly cooled within the past year. The clerics'
support of the Kabul War Lords against the Pakistani supported
Taleban Sunnis, along with the ostentatious rapprochement with
India, has further exacerbated the distance between Tehran and
Islamabad The consequences of this cooling relationship is yet to
be seen both in terms of benefits for Iran from India and possible
problems with the Baluchis in both Iranian and Pakistani
Baluchestan. With all of its other external and domestic problems,
Iran can ill afford to bring about a hostile Pakistan on its
Southeastern frontiers.
5- OMAN:
Relations with Oman seem to be relatively on a friendly basis,
with a mutual desire to maintain calm and unobstructed passage in
the Strait of Hormuz , for the benefit of both nations. It should
be emphasized that, this mutual interest is to permit the
uninterrupted flow of Oil through the Strait -- an economic
necessity for Iran, a strategic and political necessity for Oman.
6- THE STRAIT OF HORMUZ:
The current regime realizes the economic necessity of keeping
the Strait of Hormuz open for its own Oil exports; its problem is
how to deal with the Oil exports of states deemed hostile at
present or in the future. The Tehran leadership must foresee that
any attempt on their part to interfere with flow of Oil through
the Strait would incur the military intervention of the U.S.A. and
other major military powers. Focus on Iran believes that the
present clerical regime would not be capable of dealing with a
crisis involving the Strait of Hormuz.. Rather than pursuing a
rational policy concerning an uninterrupted Oil flow through an
internationally respected water-way, the current leadership is
likely to pursue a course inimical to the national security
interests of Iran. Islamic Republic's reputation as a "Pariah
State" would most likely limit its ability to formulate an
internationally acceptable policy in regards to the Strait of
Hormuz which could concurrently be beneficial to Iran's security
interests.
7 & 8 - THE PERSIAN GULF ISLANDS AND THE UNITED ARAB
EMIRATES:
The issue of Iran's sovereignty over the small Persian Gulf
islands, namely the Lesser and the Greater Tumbs and Abu Musa, are
intervened by the U.A.E. and hence, for the sake of our
discussion, are considered collectively. The value of the Islands
as a source of off-shore Oil deposits has greatly enhanced their
political and economic importance. The issue here is not
sovereignty but rather the ineptness of the Tehran regime in its
handling of the Islands' recognized sovereignty. It should be
noted that since November 1971, when Great Britain, the Sheikh of
Sharja and Iran agreed on Iran's sovereignty over the Islands, the
issue was tacitly recognized by the international community. For
misguided reasons,-the clerics in --Iran
have-possibly-re-introduced the-issue for domestic political
purposes. By doing so they have not permitted the "sleeping dogs
to lie" which, would have been the prudent and insightful course.
Now it has become an issue of conflict with the U.A.E., with the
international community not necessarily supporting the assumed
uncontested sovereignty of Iran over these Islands. The dispute
over the Islands need not have occurred. Once again Iran's
national interest has been jeopardized by the incompetence of the
clerical regime and their lack of comprehension of the
international community's temper, especially in regards to a vital
area such as the Persian Gulf.
9- QATAR:
Relations with Qatar are friendly since both countries share a
common antipathy towards the Saudi Arabia, albeit for
significantly different reasons.
The current regime has supported Qatar in its ..on again -- off
again" border dispute. From Riyadh's point of view, this border
dispute is but a minor distraction in its overall Persian Gulf
foreign policy and strategic outlook. For the Islamic Republic to
become involved in such a relatively minor problem, is to waste
important diplomatic resources at a future time when Saudi
Arabia's friendship and support might be needed, as for example,
against a resurgent and belligerent Iraq. Once again this behavior
reflects the short-sightedness and the shear level of
misunderstanding of important and critical foreign policy matters
by the Mullahs' regime in Tehran.
10- BAHRAIN:
Iran's relations with Bahrain are unnecessarily convoluted and
seemingly Machiavellian. In the far distant past, namely from the
time of the Sassanid Emperor Shapur 11 in the 4th century A.D. up
until the time of Fat'h Ali Shah Qajar, "Persia" laid claim to the
Island but, in the modern era, Iran along with the international
community and the United Nations in 1971, has recognized Bahrain's
independence. The current clerical leadership has, on several
occasions hinted at its _reassertion of claims to Bahrain, perhaps
to reinforce its sovereignty over the disputed Persian Gulf
Islands. In this "tit - for - tat" game, Islamic Republic would
not only lose all the historical credibility and control Iran has
had over these Persian Gulf Islands but would become even more
isolated in the international arena for undertaking such a scheme.
The lesson of the Persian Gulf crisis of 1990 to 1991 over Kuwait
should be borne in the minds of the clerics in Tehran. Bahrain
like Kuwait has many powerful allies who, would not permit Islamic
Republic's intimidations and threats to come to fruition.
11- SAUDI ARABIA:
It is not surprising and indeed understandable that Islamic
Republic and Saudi Arabia would be rivals for hegemony over the
Persian Gulf. The two nations represent centers of their
respective Islamic sects (Sunni Saudi Arabia - Shiite Iran). They
share economic supremacy with their respective petroleum
production. Each shares world attention because of their economic
and strategic importance. The small but significant number of
Shiite workers (around 10 percent) in the Oil fields area,
represent to the habitually reclusive and suspicious Saudi
leadership, a security threat which became a reality with the
abortive attempt to seize the great mosque at Mecca, after the
Ayatollahs' accession to power. The need for amicable relations
and cooperation between Iran and the Saudi regime would in many
ways benefit Iran far more than-the Saudis-, especially
strategically and economically. In the latter case, a cooperative
relationship could have positive results in stabilizing, if not
raising, the Oil prices in OPEC. Certainly, Iran would be a
financial beneficiary of such a cooperative effort. Strategically,
regional peace and political stability are vital to both nations.
Islamic Republic's support of terrorism and interference in the
region's national / domestic affairs can bring nothing but
eventual harm to Iran. In this matter, the Saudis are most
concerned and reactive to Tehran's foreign machinations, fearful
that in the end their regime would be subject to religious or
political undermining. This state of affairs has caused the Saudi
government to invest billions of dollars for defense and the
United States intervention in the Persian Gulf. Because of their
misguided foreign policy, the clerics have brought about mistrust
and anxieties in Riyadh along with the resultant arms race which
is potentially detrimental to all nations of the region and
perhaps more so for the Islamic Republic itself.
12- KUWAIT:
Iran's relations with Kuwait are at the most "friendly", much of
it based on their mutual concern for Saddam Husain's future
hostile intentions. It would seem that the clerical leadership
missed a golden opportunity during the Persian Gulf crisis of 1990
- 1991 to lend its moral support, at the minimum, to Kuwait - the
victim of Iraqi aggression which Iran itself experienced a decade
earlier. Because of lack of "political foresight and knowledge of
the international temper", it failed to react. In some quarters
the charge of cowardice has been placed on Iran, a charge which
the noble, enduring and courageous people of Iran do not deserve.
If Tehran sought Baghdad's gratefulness and reward for its
"neutrality" and for its objections over the United States
involvement, the trophies earned have not yet been forthcoming.
13- IRAQ:
Since the 1988 cease-fire after an 8 year war with Iraq, Iran's
relations with the latter have taken unpredictable and at times
irrational turns. One is led to believe that Tehran has done its
utmost to cant' Baghdad's favor at almost any cost and, without
apparent benefits. Focus on Iran surmises that the clerical
leadership believes (and erroneously so) that its reconciliation
with Baghdad would possibly create an Anti-Western Axis which
would ultimately include Syria. This axis would thereby threaten
Israel, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and certainly Kuwait. Tehran might
calculate that a friendly relationship with Baghdad will solve the
Kurdish problem redounding both countries. In either case, if
indeed these are Tehran's motives for its friendly relations with
Iraq, they are doomed to fail. In the first place, the likelihood
of Damascus and Baghdad reaching an accord is null considering the
irreconcilable split in the Baathist political environment and
Syria's priority of negotiating the return of the Golan Heights
for an Israeli quid-pro-quo, namely the suppression of the
clerics' backed Hizbollah terrorists in Southern Lebanon. In this
event Syria is likely to reach an accord with Israel and the
United States, at the expense of its close relationship with the
Islamic Republic. It should be noted these warm ties have cooled
over the past few years which may further indicate Damascus
jettisoning the Mullahs in Tehran for more favorable relations
with the USA. Secondly, regarding the Kurdish issue, the Kurds of
Iraq are under U.N. protection and are not likely to be entrusted
to Saddam Husain's mercy. Iran's Kurds are different and their
issues ought to be attended to in an alternative mode by a humane
national Iranian leadership. Tehran's flirtation with the pariah
regime in Baghdad could not bring long lasting benefits to the
country other than further isolation from the international
community. There is nothing to be gained by an alliance with an
outlaw regime. If the current Tehran government should bring about
a coalition or alliance with Iraq, it would indeed be the
reincarnation of the sinister Axis of the World War II era.
14-TURKEY
Among all of Iran's neighbors, Turkey has the most powerful
military force and is closest to the West (through NATO). Iran's
relation's with Turkey, since the break-up of the Ottoman Empire,
have been correct and for the most part friendly. They share, to a
certain degree, the issue of the Kurds' and desire for stability
in their adjacent regions. Over the years both nations have
participated in mutually beneficial trade and commerce as well as
uninterrupted cross border transit of people and goods. During the
cold war both nations shared the concern and defense of their
respective borders with the Soviet Union. Today the long standing
amity may be threatened by Tehran's interference in Ankara's
domestic affairs. The recent elections in Turkey, which has seen
the defeat of the secular pro-Western "True Path" Party of Prime
Minister Tansu Ciller and the slim victory of the Islamic
fundamentalist "Refah - Welfare" Party. There is evidence that
many Iranian financial and political resources are backing the "Refah"
Party. It should be noted that to date, the "Refah" Party has been
unable to form a coalition with the other pro-Western secular
parties. The "Refah" has only 21 % of the Parliament seats, far
less than the required ruling majority. It is of vital concern to
regional peace, stability and the global democratic interest that,
Turkey's government remain a secular democratic one, free of the
radical influence and/or interference of the clerics in Tehran.
Should the "Refah" Party succeed to form a coalition government in
time, the coalition partners are likely to be destroyed resulting
in a fundamentalist radical dictatorship.
15- AZARBAIJAN:
Since the 1991 collapse of the Soviet Union, the Tehran
leadership, instead of establishing a rational relationship which
relies on historical and cultural ties, has pursued a policy of
becoming involved in the domestic affairs of the newly created
Republic at Baku. Since the population of Azarbaijan is
predominantly Shiite, the task for the clerics in Tehran, on the
surface, could not be an arduous one. The desire of any religious
or political entity to wish for a neighboring state to share its
values, is comprehensible. In this instance, however, the clerics'
involvement in Baku will be eventually resented and anti-Iranian
reaction would manifest itself. It must be remembered that
Northwestern Iran has a large Azari community which could become a
problem if a hostile regime in Baku should come to power. The
Mullahs in Tehran should bear this in mind for the long term
consequences, if their current policy fails in Azarbaijan.
16- ARMENIA:
The short 30 mile border with Armenia wedged in between the
Azari enclaves of Nakhchevan and Azarbai jan, reflects some degree
of importance of Christian Armenia to Iran. The border region is
extremely rugged with no cross-border land routes. Economic and
social interaction between the two nations are not substantial and
therefore no forcible problems is likely by the clerical
leadership.
From the foregoing, it is obvious that the current clerical
regime has only a few points on its circumferential frontier where
it maintains friendly and non-controversial relations (i.e. Oman,
Kuwait, and Armenia). Among the other 13 points on its periphery,
the clerical government finds itself risking ventures ranging from
local domestic interference to threatening regional political
stability and military security. In the latter case, even risking
the military intervention of the Great Powers. In all these cases
little benefit is seen for the Iranian nation and its people given
the risks and costs to Iran. Focus on Iran is of the opinion that
the current benighted leadership in Tehran, is either blind to the
dangers facing Iran due to its vile policies towards its neighbors
or, is taking calculated risks in pursuit of unwise and
unrealistic goals. If past history were to be the guide, then it
may be judged that this is the behavior of totalitarian regimes
which ultimately causes their own downfall.