BETWEEN WASHINGTON & TEHRAN
December 1996
PURSUING MIRAGES & CONFRONTING REALITY
"In a scheme of policy which is devised for a nation, we should
not limit our views to its operation during a single year, or
even for a short term of years. We should look at its operation
for a considerable time, and in war as well as in peace."
Henry Clayb> (American Statesman 1777- 1852)
Recently, US officials formally declared that the United
States is interested in establishing communications, and even
rapprochement, with the Islamic Republic of Iran. In late
October 1996, while on an official visit to the United Arab
Emirates (UAE), Assistant Secretary of State Robert Pelletreau
expressed hope that the US and ban will revive communications
during President Clinton's second term in office. "We are open
to dialogue with the Government of Iran," Pelletreau declared.
Asked about the Clinton Administration's attitude toward the
current policy of containment and isolation, Pelletreau stated:
"Nobr* thinks this is a perfect situation." Meanwhile, in
private communications, Washington once again asked Persian Gulf
governments which maintain good relations with Iran, to
intercede with Tehran in order to open up venues of" dialogue"
with Washington.
Washington's Illusions
to improving relations with the regime in Iran.
Significantly, at the very same time, the US hardened its
declared position against Iran, putting pressure on such allies
as Germany and Japan to reduce the volume of their commercial
relations with Iran. Given the contradictory messages, little
wonder that Tehran was confused about the sincerity of the
Clinton Administration. Moreover, concurrent Iranian strategic
studies reaffirmed Tehran's conviction that the unfolding
regional and global strategic dynamics was pushing the US and
Iran to an inevitable confrontation over the future of the
Middle East and the Muslim World as a whole.
Tehran assumed, and not without reason, that Washington was
fully aware of this reality. Hence, Iranian officials reasoned,
there was something sinister in the American initiatives -- a
conspiracy to undermine the Mullahs' regime. Therefore, Tehran
chose to ignore the American communiqués delivered by allies
during the spring of 1996. Undaunted by the Iranian rebuff, the
Clinton Administration sought new ways to convince Tehran of its
sincerity. In the early summer, the White House decided to go
public with the US desire to improve relations with Iran in an
effort to reassure Tehran. In mid June, President Clinton gave an
interview to Al-Sharq al-Awsat - a Saudi-owned newspaper published
in London - in which he invited Tehran to a dialogue with his
Administration. Washington was "prepared at any time to have a
full and frank dialogue" with Tehran, the President stated, as
long as these contacts were with an authoritative and official
representative of Tehran. President Clinton went further to assure
Tehran of Washington's good intentions. He stated that the US
"does not seek to overthrow the Government of the Islamic Republic
of Iran. Nor do we seek a military confrontation with Iran." The
President's message was aimed not only at the Iranians - the
obvious objective of these statements --but also at the Saudi
Government President Clinton now openly stated what the
Administration had been telling Riyadh and other Persian Gulf
states for a few months then. With the elections campaign peaking
and the President's foreign policy under sharp attack, the Clinton
Administration concluded that the paralysis of the key initiatives
must end. Hence, the obstacles to both the peace process in the
Middle East and the implementation of the Dayton Accords in
Bosnia-Herzegovina must be removed virtually at all cost. Thus, it
became imperative to break the ice with the Mullahs in Tehran and
find ways to communicate in order to provide the President with
the "foreign policy achievements" he needed so badly.
The Logic Behind the Initiative
By now, the Clinton Administration had to justify the drastic
change in its Iran policy. The official explanation was that
this initiative was motivated by Washington's own realization
that the policy of all out "containment" of Iran had failed. The
US has failed to isolate the clerics in Iran, or disrupt the
latter's economic connections with the rest of the world.
Meanwhile, several American journalists and columnists,
including some very close to the Administration, visited Iran
and returned with tales of growing pragmatism, and even
moderation, of the regime. In a series of columns and articles,
they have urged rethinking of Washington's present policy toward
Iran and putting an end to the all out confrontational attitude.
Essentially, these articles and columns provided public
reinforcement for the preferable policy of the Clinton
Administration.
The Clinton Administration also seeks to justify the policy
changes by citing the urging from some of America's closest allies
-particularly Germany and Japan - to weaken the embargo in order
not to harm their own trade practices. Washington points out that
several Arab states, especially in the Persian Gulf, are also
urging the reduction of the level of tension between the US and
Iran given the extent of the clerics' threat -- both outright
military and Islamist subversion and terrorism -- they are facing.
The European and Arab allies insist that the policy of isolation
and containment is a relic of the Cold War and no longer fit the
posture of the "New World Order". Instead, the allies argue, the
behavior of even the most rogue states can be best amended through
the combination of "constructive engagement" and economic
incentives. Consequently, the Clinton Administration can portray
its initiative as a reaction to pressure from allies and advise
from experts.
Given the dire implications to its overall policies, the
Clinton Administration feels compelled to break the deadlock in
the US relations with Iran. "toward the end of 1996, there emerged
an urgent need in Washington to prevent 'Tehran from toppling one
key foreign policy "achievement" of the Clinton Administration
after another. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, Tehran and its allies
prevent the implementation of the Dayton Accords. In the Persian
Gulf, the Mullahs and their local allies destabilize the region to
the point of near collapse of several governments allied with the
US. Elsewhere in the Middle East, the Islamic Republic is behind
the wave of terrorism that led to the downfall of Shimon Peres,
President Clinton's favorite in the Israeli elections, and the
virtual collapse of the Arab-Israeli peace process.
Tehran-sponsored terrorists are subverting Egypt and threatening
the Mubarak administration. The Mullahs' surge into Central Asia
and their influence over Turkey is growing. Islamic Republic has
been implicated in numerous acts of terrorism against the US, such
as the recent bombings in Saudi Arabia. Tehran was also implicated
in a series of political assassinations throughout Western Europe.
Indeed, in the Fall of 1996, the US initiative policy was defined
and articulated to both the European allies and the states of the
Persian Gulf as a measure of last resort. In view of the temporary
failure of the confrontational containment and attempts to impose
international isolation, there remains perhaps a futile goal that
economic incentives and legitimization through communications will
reduce militancy of the Mullahs.
Tehran's Resolute Position
The only thing missing from this political initiative of the
Clinton Administration is comprehension of Tehran's position.
From the very first days of the Islamic Revolution, the essence
of the Mullahs' stand vis-a-vis the US has been that of a
profound confrontation that cannot be reconciled. The Mullahs'
Tehran has never sought to abide by the norms and logic of
international relations. The mere fact that terrorism
constitutes a cornerstone of Iran's international policy
illustrates this point. The Mullahs need to make a 180 degree
turn in the tenets of the Islamic Republic's political doctrine
before they could even begin to react positively to the American
initiative. And Tehran has made no such turns, neither has it
demonstrated even a slight inclination to do so. Not that Tehran
ignored the US efforts. Tehran could not miss both the US
initiative and the underlining logic behind them. Indeed, in
recent weeks, clerical leaders reiterated their objection to any
rapprochement with Washington. Starting early November, Iranian
media and other government circles, have repeatedly stressed not
only their objection to any rapprochement with Washington, but
emphasized that such a move will prove harmful to the vital
interests of the Islamic Republic.
In mid November, an editorial by'Ali Akbar Dareini in the
English language KAYIIAN INTERNATIONAL provided an authoritative
reaction to Secretary Pelletreau's invitation for a dialogue.
Tehran examined Pelletreau's statements in the context of the
overall duplicity. Dareini explains that "Washington s policy
toward Iran has two distinctive faces" aimed to contribute to the
weakening of the Mullahs' regime. One' face" is an effort to
establish rapprochement in order to neutralize Iran, and the other
is a commitment to pressuring Iran through confrontation. Hence,
the US initiative was but one facet of an on going policy.
Indeed, Dareini argues, Pelletreau's initiative was balanced by
threats from Washington over the Iranian conduct of International
terrorism. "Last month, the US Assistant Secretary of State for
the Near East Robert Pelletreau called, during a visit to UAE, for
a dialogue with Iran. And it has been confirmed recently that the
US Administration has written a letter to Iran threatening to take
action against Tehran if it continued what is says '.support for
terrorism'." Daremi concludes that the common denominator of these
two essentially contradictory approaches toward Iran is that they
are driven by the collapse of the regional policy of the Clinton
Administration. "While willingness to open dialogue with Iran is
viewed as Washington accepting its Middle East foreign policy
failure without recognizing Iran's rights, the anti-Iran rhetoric
like the recent letter is nothing but a sign of frustration."
A very confident and assertive Tehran even warned the Persian
Gulf governments against taking part in this US political
initiative. This message was delivered by Iranian Interior
Minister Mohammad'Ali Besharati during his mid November visit to
Doha, Qatar. Besharati dismissed Washington's accusations against
Iran for sponsoring terrorism as yet another effort to exert
pressure on Iran. "That is not new. The United States always says
that, but we are strong," he explained. Besharati concurred that
the growing American frustration with the failure of its Iran
policy might push the Clinton Administration into a military
confrontation in the Persian Gulf. Tehran, he said, was ready to
confront any US move against Iran. "There is no problem in this
context, and we feel there is no problem with regard to
confrontation, but the region cannot bear such talk." .
Besharati stressed that Tehran was convinced that the recent US
initiatives -- both the desire to establish a dialogue and the
threats concerning terrorism sponsorship -- were expressions of
despair because of the total collapse of the Clinton
Administration's policy. "They [the Americans] have suffered
enough failures in their foreign policy, and Europe is now
confronting the United States. It decided against a US decision to
boycott us economically. And the world opposed the United States
in this connection." Tehran, Besharati assured, had no intention
what so ever to assist the United States. Instead, Tehran invited
its Arab neighbors to join in a joint regional security system
that will not include or permit the presence of US and other
foreign forces in the Persian Gulf area. By late November, Tehran
hardened its position. Iranian officials now expect that the
confrontation between the U.S. and Iran will continue during
the second term of President Clinton. In an interview with
AL-WASAT -- a Saudi-owned weekly published in London -Ayatollah
Mohammad'Ali Taskhiri. the Iranian presidential advisor on
international relations and supervisor of Iranian cultural centers
worlwide, was extremely harsh in his attacks on President Clinton.
"I believe that President Clinton is under the control of the
Jewish lobby up to his ears. The positions taken publicly and in
practice prompt me not to expect any change in his attitude after
reelection." Ayatollah Taskhiri stressed that Tehran considers the
recent US initiatives to be a part of a plot against Iran. "We
question US political intentions and we know that they are hostile
to us. That is why we interpret any proposal for contact and
rapprochement as a mere maneuver because we know the American
methods and schemes to strike at the lslamic revolution everywhere
and in all directions." In view of the continued American threat
to the Islamic Republic, Ayatollajh Taskhiri concluded, there is
no alternative to the continuation of the resolute struggle
against the i 1S.
Preserving Khomevni's Legacy
Further more, despite the lure of economic gains from a
rapprochement with the United States, Tehran left no doubt that
such a move is out of the question because it constitutes a
profound deviation from Khomeyni's teachings. Writing in RESAALAT,
Alireza Shemirani elucidated Tehran's approach to dealing with the
United States.
"If one examines the practical and pragmatic aspects of
potential US-Iranian relations, it is possible to assume that
under certain conditions Iran might reduce hostility) toward the
US. The conclusion of such a view is that the hostili4 , between
Iran and America will not be permanent and it could even be
claimed that the establishment of relations with America is not an
impossibility." But under present conditions, Shemirani is quick
to point out, this only a theoretical issue. Presently, "while the
Americans are hostile to our people and country, we will continue
to confront them and defend ourselves. In this case, negotiating
lvith America or establishing ties with it will be unxvise and
against our national interests." But this overall approach to
relations with the US is based on the notion that both Iran and
the United States are just ordinary countries motivated by the
evolution of their respective interests. This perception,
Shemirani argues, is a gross mistake. Nobody can and should ignore
that Iran is an Islamic Republic and not an ordinary state.
Therefore, Tehran must take this unique ideological character into
consideration when formulating policies. Shemirani emphasizes that
nobody in Tehran should forget "that our revolution is a religious
one, based on Islamic values, and that Islam is a global religion
and not confined to a specific geographical location or