Of the best rulers, the people (only) know that they exist.
The next best they love and praise. The next they fear, and the
next they revile. When they do not command the people's faith,
some will lose faith in them, and then they resort to oaths! But
(of the best) when their task is accomplished, their work done,
the people all remark, " We have done it ourselves."
- Lao Tzu
The time has now arrived for an immediate change in the
leadership of Iran. Critical events both inside and outside of
Iran make imperative the replacement of the current dictatorial
and ineffective clerical regime. Every day we are made aware of
domestic and external events directly related to Iran and for
the most part the news casts a negative if not dangerous
reflection on the course of the clerical regime's policies and
dealings with these fast-breaking events. These events range
from domestic disturbances and instability over deteriorating
economic conditions and governmental suppression to state
sponsored terrorism, nuclear armament, etc. Above all, these
events are having a deleterious effect on the viability of the
Iranian nation both in the present and for the future. Indeed,
the unity of the nation is put at risk if change does not
immediately take place.
1n all matters relating to the replacement of the regime, the
highest priority as to decision-making and its subsequent courses
of action must be given to the wishes and desires of the Iranian
people. Without their support, moral and physical, there cannot be
an effective, democratic, and credible leadership in Iran. On this
fundamental premise of a new Iranian leadership.
Focus On Iran gives its full and unconditional support and will
do whatever it can to bring the desires of the Iranian people to
reality. In this issue we will endeavor to address the following
questions and thoughts directly related to the compelling need for
the change in leadership. Furthermore, Focus On Iran believes the
ensuing discussions will serve as guidance and rationale for the
right choices to be made by the Iranian people in their desire to
bring about democracy and popular supported leadership in Iran.
The questions and thoughts concerning the need for new leadership
to be addressed include:
1. Why is a new leadership now necessary?
2. What are the desired personal, political, and ideological
characteristics desired of the new leadership?
3. Where will the new leadership come from, and when will it
occur?
4. How will the new leadership come to power?
5. Thoughts and commentary on the success or failure to bring
about a change in the leadership.
THE NECESSITY OF A NEW LEADERSHIP
The necessity for a new leadership is directly related to
continuous process, since the inception of the rule of the clerics
in Tehran, of Iran's deteriorating condition at home and abroad.
The conditions can be summarized as follows: the decay of popular
support for the current government and its leadership; declining
confidence of the international community towards the Iranian
government and the attendant decline in Iran's international
prestige and influence; failure of the leadership's ability in
administrative control and command/control of its security
requirements; a rapidly declining economic, financial and physical
infrastructure with its related human distress and the failure to
develop a plan for Iran's future in a global economy and a greater
international environment of democratic practice and cooperation.
The declining popular support of the current regime is evidenced
by not only repression of the masses, but also among the clergy
itself. Popular discontent in the cities is now frequent and
accompanied by the loss of life, casualties, and imprisonment.
These civil disturbances/riots have, since 1993, increasingly
taken place throughout the country including Arak, Mashad, Shiraz,
Qazvin, Zahedan, and Islamshahr. Most of the discontent is caused
by economic distress and opposition to the repressive actions of
the government. This discontent has reached the point of
increasing defections to locations outside Iran of not only
ordinary citizens but government officials as the recent defection
of high intelligence officials and the most recent hijacking of an
Iranian aircraft to Israel. More defections are to be expected as
conditions inside Iran continue to deteriorate. What is perhaps
even more significant evidence of the repressiveness of the Tehran
regime is the increasing opposition of the clergy. Much of the
clerical opposition stems from their opposing the political
involvement and its secular nature in which the current clerical
government leadership dominates. Secondly, the clerical opposition
faults the clerical regime for its repression of basic civil
rights and the pervasive corruption, especially in high
governmental circles. Two grand ayatollahs, representing the
highest level of the Shia clerical establishment, have been under
house arrest for the past ten years, Grand Ayatollahs Ghomi in
Mashad and Sadeq Ruhani in Ghom. Their arrest status has been
protested to the governmental leadership by such notables as the
former ambassador to the Vatican, Hojjatol-Islam Khosroshahi.
Another important cleric, Hojjatol-Islam Rahbar, severely
criticized the government for its failures in economic policy and
its abuse of human rights. It should be further noted that since
the advent of the present regime many of the lower clergy have
criticized the repressive practices of the government and have as
a result paid the price. Over a thousand are imprisoned and
hundreds have been executed for active opposition to the
government. The most significant factor bringing on unrest among
the masses, and its attendant repression, is the worsening
economic condition and the deteriorating service infrastructure.
Inflation and shortages, the decay of the social status of women,
declining standard of living and rampant unemployment, present a
dreary picture of life in present-day Iran -- a condition which
the government is incapable of correcting. Even though Iran's
economic troubles have been immensely magnified by the recent war
with Iraq, much of the economic distress since the end of the war,
(1988) and the failure of sub sequential economic and
material/infrastructure is due to the mishandling of the economy
and financial interests of the nation. This is shown by its
failure to
understand the dynamics of international finance as closely tied
to good international relations. In other words, by casting itself
as a "pariah state", Iran under the clerics, has cut itself off
from important international banking centers, particularly those
where the United States exerts great influence. Secondly, despite
an inflow of oil revenues, albeit at a lower per barrel rate than
in previous years, the government has failed to invest these
resources wisely in the productive sector of the economy, opting
to invest in less essential military and nuclear technologies
among others. From the very visible and frequent civil disorders
and reports of defectors, the government's failure to relieve the
economic distress of the masses is reaching a critical stage and
may well be the spark to ignite a new revolution. Aside from the
Tehran regime's failure in its domestic programs as discussed
above, its record in the international arena of foreign
policy/foreign relations is equally abysmal and moreover, far more
threatening to its own security, regional, and indeed world peace.
Three trends and active engagements bear concern:
l) the current regime's pursuit of the "nuclear option";
2) the continued involvement in state-sponsored terrorism and
fomenting instability in selected target states;
and
3) The pursuit of closer relations with Saddam Hussein of Iraq.
The recent $1 billion deal with Russia for an ostensible
nuclear power plant in Bushehr, was a rash financial commitment in
time of economic distress has evoked a trenchant response from the
international community -namely that the expended uranium fuel of
the power plant can, with available technology, be converted to
weapons grade plutonium. Given the conditions prevailing in post
soviet Russia, the abundance of rogue nuclear scientists in Iraq
and elsewhere, obtaining the necessary reprocessing technology
would not be a difficult task. Furthennore, it is known in the
international intelligence community, that various agents, at the
behest of the Iranian government have been "shopping" for an
assortment of materials which can be utilized to assemble a
nuclear reprocessing facility for weapons grade plutonium. It
should be noted that this technique was employed by Iraq as it
constructed its nuclear weapons facility in the late 1970s. As
part of its "nuclear option", the present regime has been
endeavoring to obtain nuclear weapons, notably from sources in the
former Soviet Central Asian Republics. In fact, some reliable
intelligence sources affirm that Iran has already obtained such a
weapon, specifically, one 152 mm nuclear artillery round and one
warhead. This search fits into the proposition that Iran's
purchase of the upgraded Scud-C surface-to surface missile (SSM)
and the longer range No-bong SSM from North Korea could be fitted
with nuclear warheads. The technology for this "mating" can be
obtained from the above mentioned nuclear-tipped artillery round.
The ramifications of Iran's pursuit of a "nuclear option" poses a
catastrophic threat to Iran itself, perhaps more immediately, than
the threat to its regional neighbors. It is not unreasonable that
Iran lays itself open to a pre-emptive strike at its nuclear
facility if the nuclear threat is deemed to be a reality. The
third foreign policy "radical" option, is the Mullahs continued
promotion of terrorism in the Middle East, Western Europe, and
indeed, the United States. The clerical regime's "fingerprints"
have been traceable to terrorism in Egypt, Lebanon, and New York;
murders of "enemies of the State" in Paris and other parts of
Europe, and undermining and infiltration of governments in Sudan,
Algeria, Turkey, and the newly independent Muslim states of the
former Soviet Union. The hearings of the intelligence and other
committees of the United States congress bear witness to Iran's
extensive de-stabilizing activities throughout the world. Even if
this litany of Iran's extra-legal and war-like activities proves
factual and becomes a reality, the blame must be laid in the hands
of the clerical leadership as due to their incompetence,
foolhardiness, and ignorance of the realities of the international
community. The current leadership's flirtation with Saddam Hussein
for political and military support, like its other foreign policy
ventures is both foolhardy and dangerous for Iran. A
"Tehran-Baghdad Axis", if implemented, would threaten the power
balance in the Persian Gulf region and ultimately the entire
Middle East. The immediate threat to Kuwait and Saudi Arabia is
obvious; the threat to overthrow the moderate regime in Jordan and
the military threat to Israel with Scud-C and No-Dong SSMs is a
reality as was seen with the Iraqi Scud attack on Israel during
Desert Stom. The consequences for Iran in such a scenario is to
bring the threat of increased American presence in the Persian
Gulf and perhaps pre-emptive strikes against Iranian missile
launch sites, if not other targets. Adhering to Iraq, another
"pariah state' would only further isolate Iran from the world
community it needs for economic recovery. It is hard to
rationalize the Iranian leadership's -ftsttnntion with Sad-am
Hussein, their erstwhile enemy. Perhaps the leadership feels it
can manipulate Baghdad to accommodate its political and security
needs or perhaps as it too was a "loser" in a recent war, it may
feel that it with Saddam Hussein can achieve revenge or a revision
of the past humiliation against the perceived enemy, the "Great
Satan" whoever or wherever it may be. History has taught us to be
wary of defeated nations seeking solace in alliances with the aim
of rectifying perceived past injustices. We need only to study the
post World War I European chronicle of tragic events to be wary of
an Iranian-Iraqi "Axis". This again reaffirms the inadequacy and
failure of the clerical leadership to deal with the outside world
which it does not comprehend.
THE CHARACTERISTICS OF A NEW LEADERSHIP
Focus On Iran in a recent issue severely criticized the Peoples'
Mojahedin Organization and its leadership because of the fact that
it is not only cultist, absolutist and undemocratic, has a long
history of terrorist activities which it still is very proud of,
but is an avowed ally (if not a stooge) of Saddam Hussein. Focus
On Iran has warned repeatedly of the futility and the dangers of
replacing the current despotic regime with another similar or even
worse. Once more, this warning must be repeated as reminder to all
who believe in freedom and democracy. The new leadership must
unequivocally manifest its belief in democracy and democratic
principles, and show credible evidence of its commitment to the
civil liberties and rights of the Iranian men and women. The first
and most important characteristic of the new leadership is its
choice and approval by the Iranian people. the new leadership,
above all, must respond to the people's will through the
democratic process of selection and election. The new leadership
must be the guarantors of the people's liberties and justice under
a rule of law. It must adhere to a constitution providing complete
liberties of thought, speech, and religious freedom. In this way,
the new leadership will establish among the people who they have
committed themselves to serve and to ensure support and loyalty of
the Iranian people. The new leadership must have the ability and
knowledge and dedication to restructure Iran's foreign policy to
re-establish the country's prestige and respect in the
international community. The new leadership must disavow all
linkages with this regime's foreign relations misadventures as
noted above and above all, become a prime source for maintaining
regional peace, reducing tensions through interstate mutual
accords and desist from aligning Iran with such international
"pariahs" as Iraq. The new leadership must be firmly committed to
repairing its relations with the United States, not only as a
matter of a correct and mutually beneficial foreign policy
objective but once more re-establishing slid tradition" - of good
relations between the Iranian and American people. Closely related
to the above foreign policy characteristics, the new leadership
must renounce its secretive "nuclear option". If, through
objective, environmental/scientific and economic analysis the new
leadership finds that nuclear power is feasible and will
significantly improve Iran's economic condition and standard of
living for the nation's people, then it should undertake a nuclear
energy policy with the full cooperation and adherence to the
provisions of the International Atomic Energy Agency, the Nuclear
Non-proliferation Treaty, and other international nuclear
safe-guard treaties, agreements or provisions. Thus the new
leadership will assure the region and the rest of the world of its
peaceful intentions and resolve in nuclear matters.
WHEN AND WHERE WILL THE LEADERSHIP EMERGE FROM?
It is more difficult to ascertain the exact moment when the new
leadership will take over the governing of the nation. It is
comparatively easier to ascertain where the leadership will come
from. Optimally, the change of leadership should occur now in a
peaceful manner with minimal internal stress and disruption. The
relatively peaceful manner by which the nations of Eastern Europe
threw off the yoke of communism in 1989/90 would serve as a model.
Hopefully, the current clerical leadership will realize its
failures in governance and will step down, thus avoiding human
suffering and physical harm to the nation. Focus On Iran believes
that the critical time for change of leadership, whether by the
questionable voluntary resignation or other means, will come as an
unambiguous signal form the people. When conditions of repression
or economic distress become so intolerable that it can no longer
be borne by the people, they will rise and make their demands
known. this is a fact of history, both in ancient and modern
times. There is sufficient evidence that critical moment, if not
already at hand, is rapidly approaching. All would-be leaders of a
democratic era must be prepared to step in and assume the course
of change. Indeed, they should now be preparing for that near-time
eventuality. Finally, where and who decides the new leadership?
The answer, simple and direct is form either inside or outside
Iran and without equivocation, to be chosen and approved by the
people of Iran. The will of the people must prevail in this
matter. The Azadegan Foundation asserts that there is a reservoir
of committed, dedicated, potential democratic leaders in Iran and
within the exile community abroad. Furthermore, Azadegan will give
its unequivocal support to that leadership which proves its
worthiness by past, present, and future deeds.
HOW WILL THE NEW LEADERSHIP COME TO POWER?
As noted above, the transition to the new leadership must be
done peacefully with minimal human and physical harm, preferably
by a voluntary resignation of power and authority by the current
clerical leadership. The only other path would be a forceful
replacement. It would be of great value that potential new leaders
draw up manifestos and other materials, by which the people can
show their approval or disapproval and recommendations.
Preparation for a provisional government with its proposed
leadership should be put before the people. Provisions must be
made whereby the people themselves may nominate their choices for
leadership, at least as provisional leaders, until a permanent
government structure is approved and put into operation. It is
extremely important that the planning for the instruments of
leadership transition must now begin, whether by individual
potential leaders or by leadership collectives. Functioning
networks among "liberation"" groups for coordination/cooperation
among like-minded democratic leaders must be established as soon
as possible. Lack of establishing such a coordinating network
could prove extremely damaging to any successful, peaceful
transition to democratic leadership and worst of all, could leave
the Iranian people in confusion and disarray. Among the most
important matters which must be agreed upon by the potential new
leadership networks is the formulation of the means by which the
people will express their desires and approval or disapproval.
Secondly, the means and procedures for securing the approval and
support of the Armed Forces, and for providing for the security of
the nation during the critical time of transition. There are many
more details which cannot be discussed at this time, but must be
taken into account by the future leadership. As said so often,
"the devil is in the detail" -- it is the details which now must
be attended to. This is a most important factor by which any new
leadership can show its worthiness and ability to lead/assume the
new democratic leadership.
IMMEDIATE ACTION IS CRUCIAL
From all which has been said in this presentation, it should be
obvious that failure will bring continued repression and economic
misery to the people of Iran. Failure of new potential leaders to
plan for a transition at the appropriate time could bring about a
revolutionary 'blood bath', both destructive to human life and
property. Moreover, without coordination among the 'liberation'
groups, disputes and disarray, anarchic conditions could prevail
among the potential leadership and their followers. This must be
categorically avoided. If there is such a disarray, then the
reinstitution of another despotic regime is in the offing. Failure
in the foreign policy sector could sec further isolation of Iran
in the world community as in the cases of North Korea and Libya.
The continuation of the "nuclear option" could leave Iran open to
pre-emptive strikes with its attendant loss of life, property and
economic investment. Finally, failure to understand and implement
a coherent foreign policy could bring the danger of the nation's
regional dismemberment, Baluchestan, Azarbaijan. Khuzestan,
Kurdestan etc., and dangerous hostile relations with its neighbors
in former Soviet Central Asia and the Caucasus, and Pakistan.
Failure in dealing rationally in the world community, in the end,
will result in the removal of all sources of financial, material,
and technological assistance to Iran which it so desperately needs
for the betterment of its people and the nation.