THE
CLERICAL REGIME'S OPPOSITION TO THE MIDDLE EAST PEACE INITIATIVES
June 1996
"A ruler given to tyranny undermines his
own sovereignty.
" Saadi-Iranian Poet (A.D. 1194-1291)
(AN ANALYSIS OF REASONS, MOTIVES, AND
OBJECTIVES)
Since the founding of the current regime, as an aftermath of
the 1979 Revolution, Iran has steadfastly opposed all measures
of peace and reconciliation between Israel and its neighbors.
The clerical regime has never visibly clarified its ultimate
goals/objectives or even basic motives for this opposition.
However, from its external behavior in the areas affected by the
peace process, Foots on Iran is able to discern and identify
five somewhat distinct objectives of its foreign policy or,
theocratic and security interests. At this point in time, it is
not clear to us at what cost and j ust how far the ruling
clerics are willing to go to achieve these objectives.
Furthermore, the importance and priority which the current
Iranian regime has assigned to these objectives is not yet
known. It is hoped that the future Iranian actions in the
foreign policy arena will make its real intentions and
objectives or motives much clearer and thus afford the
international community and others concerned by this behavior,
the opportunity to act accordingly to the threat posed. In this
issue, Focus onIran has endeavored to give guidance tocounter
Tehran's threat to regional peace, stability and security.
The five objectives we have been able to depict from the
regime's external behavior include:
1) Military presence and pressure directly against Israel:
2) Fundamentalist religious leadership and credibility:
3) Radical political ideology and control, with support of
international terrorism:
4) Strategic military balance in its favor: and
Anti-Americanism.
These issues will be discussed later in Part B, under motives
and objectives for opposition to peace. Since the beginning of
this decade, Islamic Republic's external behavior in support of
the above mentioned objectives and motives has been manifested in
its espousal of various international terrorist activities,
subversion of moderate governments, pursuit of domestic nuclear
program, promotion of revolutionary Islam, and support of
fundamentalist religious regimes. Ultimately this negative and
misguided behavior of the clerical le adership could lead to
Iran's isolation from the international community and indeed, more
dangerously, the physical damage or destruction of the nation
itself.
B. MOTIVES & OBJECTIVES FOR OPPOSITION TO PEACE:
1) Military presence and pressure directed against Israel: It
may be assumed that the desire for regional political-military
hegemony as the so-called "spokesman and leader of the Muslim
World", is probably the most compelling motive for the mullahs'
opposition to any Arab-Israeli peace/reconciliation. From Tehran's
perspective, Israel would be the ultimate beneficiary of a peace
settlement with its neighbors, especially with Syria. Rightly or
wrongly, Tehran sees its alliance with Syria as a cornerstone in
gaining military dominance in the region, especially against
Israel's military superiority. Moreover, the "Syrian Connection"
provides Iran with a credible counterforce against its inherent
adversary, Iraq. By its opposition to an Israeli-Syrian peace
settlement, the clerical leadership insures its pressure and
control of the Hezbollah in southern Lebanon.
In this context, Tehran could no longer maintain a military
relationship with Damascus because of its violent hostility to
Israel. More importantly, Syria's connection with Iran forces
Baghdad to cover its western frontier with military assets it
would have likely deployed on its Iranian frontier. It should be
noted that the Tehran-Damascus connection has no significant
religious or ideological foundation. In contrast to Iran, Syria
has a secular government and a predominantly Sunni populace. The
Tehran-Damascus alliance has been one of military expediency.
The somewhat tenuous nature of the relationship between Syria
and Iran was exhibited during the Persian Gulf war crisis of
1990-91 when Syria gave its unconditional support to the U.S.-led
coalition against Baghdad. while Tehran's leaders remained silent,
and even criticized the United States for its "intervention" in
the region's "internal affairs". In this instance, the clerics'
anti-Americanism exceeded their interest in molding to the
Damascus connection and its long-standing enmity towards Iraq.
Secondly, Islamic Republic's control of Hezbollah in southern
Lebanon would be virtually coming to an end in an IsraeliSyrian
accord. Tehran rightly realizes that among the demands made by
Israel on Syria would be the latter's abolition of the Hezbollah.
For Syria, the trade-off is not too complex: the return of the
Golan Heights and perhaps a demilitarized upper
Jordan Valley and both sides of the Israeli-Lebanese frontier
for its recognition of, or normalized relations with Israel. Would
Syria abandon its Tehran connection for the Golan? In order to
assure the survivability of the alliance, the Tehran regime must
endeavor to prevent the accord from ever materializing.
In order to achieve this objective, Tehran has stepped up its
financial and material support of Hezbollah and has concomitantly
"egged them on" to aggressive actions against Israeli forces in
southern Lebanon and the bombardment of Northern Israel's Hula
Valley. The loss of the "Syrian Connection" and its attendant
Hezbollah control would undoubtedly end clerical Tehran's dream of
a Middle East wide, political-military influence, if not hegemony.
For the Mullahs'regime, the stakes are indeed high. For Iran there
is another potential cause for concern. An Israeli-Syrian accord
would increase Israel's political and diplomatic prestige in the
region, especially in the Persian Gulf. Hezbollah's threat would
be relaxed and perhaps in the distant future, it could be placed
at the disposal of a friendly Persian Gulf State to counter a
future Iranian threat in the region. As of the time of this
writing, Prime Minister Peres is on an unprecedented visit to Oman
and Qatar. This visit, a likely reaction to the Emirs presence at
the Rabin funeral may presage the normalization of Israeli
-Omani/Qatari relations. The presence of Persian Gulf States
friendly to Israel, would be anathema to the Islamic Republic.
Disruption of the peace process from Tehran's perspective, could
embarrass Israeli prestige abroad, especially with potentially
friendly Middle East States, e.g. Oman, Qatar, Bahrain and Kuwait.
It should be noted, that as of this issue of Focus on Iran, the
clerical government severely criticized Qatar and Oman. As might
be expected, this was an aftermath of those countries acceptance
of the recent visit by Israel's Prime Minister.
More to the point, it reflects Tehran's concern about Israel's
expanding diplomatic initiatives in the Arab world as witnessed by
the most friendly personal and diplomatic relations with Jordan.
To re-iterate, from Tehran's perspective, scuttling of the
Syrian-Israeli peace process would diminish Israel's diplomatic
prestige and credibility. 2) Fundamentalist religious leadership
and credibility: Islamic Republic's preoccupation with advancing
the cause of Shi'ite fundamentalism centers on its Hezbollah
clients in southern Lebanon and very likely the Hamas terrorists
of Gaza and the West Bank. The clerical regime's long standing
support of Hezbollah in particular, serves Tehran's objective of
establishing a fundamentalist Shi'ite foothold in Lebanon as: 1) A
springboard for further expansion in the region: 2) Putting
military pressure on Israel and indirectly for Syria's support in
that effort: and 3) Establishing the current regime's credibility
as the leader in Islamic fundamentalism.
The viability of Hezbollah in southern Lebanon is primarily
dependent on Syria for logistical and material support and on Iran
for financial, moral and religious support. It follows from this
triangular relationship between Iran, Syria and Hezbollah, that in
order for its continuance, the peace initiative between Syria and
Israel must not come to fruition. As mentioned earlier, Israel's
requirement from Syria in return . for its withdrawal from the
Golan Heights is Syria's abandonment of Hezbollah if not forcing
the latter out of southern Lebanon.
Since the Tehran leadership is essentially of a theocratic
nature, its commitment is to expand its ideological doctrine (i.e.
Khomeini-ism/ Shi'ite fundamentalism). The theological reason for
being and the credibility of the current government of the mullahs
thus rests largely on the success of its support of client groups
(e.g. Hezbollah) and its gaining control of Hamas. With its
control of the Hamas group, Tehran achieves not only another
significant harassing element against Israel, but perhaps more
importantly, gains a potential successor to Arafat's newly formed
West Bank Palestinian government. The likelihood of Hamas'
ultimate victory over Arafat, has at least a 50 % chance of
realization. Although much of the Islamic Republic's involvement
with Hamas falls within the realm of political objective to be
discussed in the following section 3, the clerics also most likely
entertain the objective of introducing a strong Shi'ite presence
especially among the more militant, radical and less
Sunni-committed elements of Hamas. If such an adherence could be
achieved, then the mullah-led regime in Tehran will have gained a
notable victory in winning the "hearts and minds" of the most
radical of the Middle East's population.
3) Radical political ideology:
Much similar to the preceding section, the mullahs obective of
a strong presence and control of the political instruments of
power in Lebanon and the emergent Palestinian State depends on its
ability to disrupt Israel's quest for peace and normalized
relations with its neighbors. Whereas in southern Lebanon, the
Islamic regime in Tehran has quite effectively exercised political
control over Hezbollah. There is little doubt
that Tehran orchestrates the selection, training, and actions of
the Hezbollah leadership. It should also be borne in mind that
Hezbollah not only threatens Israel and causes some perplexing
problems in Damascus, but it also threatens the survival of the
tenuous political structure of Lebanon itself. This is evidenced
by the fact that despite all efforts, the Beirut government cannot
exercise its control over Hezbollah with or without Syrian
acquiescence.
One cannot but wonder if among the long range external
political objectives, resides the ultimate overthrow of the
moderate and the all-inclusive Lebanese political structure. It is
reasonable to sunrise that the Tehran regime could make use of
Hezbollah as an instrument against the Beirut government
regardless of whether it succeeds or fails in disrupting the
on-going peace process. If the peace process fails, Hezbollah's
political-military survivability is assured with a likelilncxxl of
a greater national prestige and credibility. In that event,
Hezbollah, might be further emboldened to act against Beirut,
especially if given unconditional support by the rttaallahs to
that end. Likewise, in the eventuality that the peace initiatives
succeed and Hezbollah is forced out of southern Lebanon, Tehran
could opt to "relocate" Hezbollah to central or other parts of
Lebanon, if not in designated quarters of Beirut itself. Indeed,
if such a "relocation" should occur, Hezbollah's threat to
Lebanon's government, could become a reality by its closer
proximity to Beiruit's power center. One may also surmise that
should Hezbollah "relocate" itself to the squalid quarters of
Beirut, the ingredients for urban instability and uprisings
possibly leading to another civil war would be set in place.
Islamic Republic's control of Hamas' political infrastructure
may be more likely than gaining the religious affiliation of
Hamas, as discussed above. Should this be realized, Arafat's
Palestinian government should most certainly be in jeopardy. An
Israeli-Syrian peace-normalization success would bade well for the
chances of the isolation and marginalization of Hamas. This might
come about as a result of a joint IsraeliSyrian-Jordanian
concerted effort to combat terrorism and to support a viable
Palestinian State willing to live with Israel under conditions
which it can best achieve under the current political
circumstances.
The radical political ideology of the mullah's regime is plain
and simple one of power and rule through terror and psychological
coercion or "brain washing". The suicide attacks by which innocent
people are maimed and killed are inculcated in the minds of their
lackey's as the "road to martyrdom" and eternal pleasure/rewards
in the afterlife.
This is not the true meaning of Jihad or any Islamic teaching.
It is the teaching of the extremist mullahs in Tehran, the same
teaching that caused the death of thousands of Iran's young men in
the irrational and senseless military attacks and operations in
the recent war against Iraq.
4) strategic military balance in its favor:
The end of the war with Iraq and the defeat of that State in
the Persian Gulf War has witnessed Iran's quest for redressing the
region's military balance in its favor. In Tehran's perspective
this means the maintenance of the "Syrian Connection", a strong
and visible presence in Lebanon, and a credible threat against
Israel. This posture on the Mediterranean (or the "Western Flank")
would be held in conjunction with its strong military posture
along the Persian Gulf (or the "Eastern Flank") and political
dominance in the former Soviet Republics of Azarbaijan and Turkmen
istan would assure its "Northern Flank".
The key element, the "Western Flank" can only be assured if
Syria remains steadfast to its de facto alliance with Iran against
Iraq (and as understood, against Israel). As mentioned earlier,
this condition also prevails in regards to Lebanon via the control
of Hezbollah. Iran's active presence there provides it with the
logistical and terrorist base for power projection along with
subversive operations in Egypt and the Mediterranean region,
including its current activities i n Bosnia. Moreover, a military
powerful Israel at peace with Syria, at the cost of Hezbollah,
would tem-linate the hope of the mullahs in controlling the
"Western Flank". Indeed, Israel's newly formed relationship with
Jordan and perhaps closer antiterrorist ties with Egypt and the
moderate Persian Gulf States (Oman, Qatar, Bahrain) represents the
ultimate "nightmare" scenario for the current clerical regime.
Iran's most potentially successful and feasible option again, is
to disrupt the ongoing peace initiatives between Syria and Israel.
To that end, Islamic Republic's Vice President, Hassan Habib],
welll to Damascus to re-assure and pressure Assad's regime to hold
fast to the ties with Tehran. Here also, it is likely that
Damascus will act in its own best self-interest, i.e., The
"Iranian Connection" or the "Golan Heights". Focus on Iran
believes Damascus will ultimately opt for the Golan Heights with
all theconsequences which that decision might entail. As a result,
the mullah's subsequent course of action or available option could
be critical to the regions peace and stability. This notion will
be discussed in the following Part C, Iran's Options.
5) Anti-Americanism:
The clerical leadership's anti-American attitude, considered
by many as bordering on pathological, stems from the American
support of the Monarchy in Iran. The four hundred and forty four
day hostage-taking ordeal, is a witness to that pathological
behavior. It naturally follows that, any endeavor or initiative
undertaken by the United States will meet with a "knee-jerk"
opposition from Tehran, regardless of its merit or advantage to
Iran. For example, the U.S. led "Desert Storm" operation in every
sense was beneficial to the security and political interests of
Iran. Yet the short-sighted rulers in Tehran could not endorse the
enterprise, not even its ostensible moral basis. Instead, they
chose to criticize the United States with an incredulous rationale
which was universally rejected. This action, isolated Iran even
more, thus further enforcing its image of a "Pariah State" in the
eyes of the international community. The quest for peace and
stability in the Middle East has been a paramount U.S. foreign
policy goal since the end of the 1973 Yom Kippur War. The motives
for U.S. interest in this matter lie in its economic (e.g. Oil)
interests, ties with Israel, support of moderate regimes,
anti-terrorism, and (until 1991) opposition to Soviet ambitions in
the region. Since the end of its war with Iraq, Tehran views the
American policy goals as antithetical to its own as discussed in
sections 1 through 4 earlier.
The culmination of peace accords between Israel and Syria at
the sponsorship and initiative of the United States, would
represent the ultimate foreign policy victory for Washington and
an irreparable blow to the mullahs in Tehran, from every
perspective. In the eyes of the clerical leadership, the "U.S.
must be defeated" for all the reasons pointed out previously, but
perhaps more importantly (indeed psychologically for the
leadership) the "defeat of the Great Satan" must come about.
In this irrational desire for the ultimate defeat of the U.S.
in the Middle East, one is reminded of Captain Ahab's pursuit and
his irrational hatred and compulsion towards the great White Whale
in Melville's "Moby Dick". There may be a deeper motive for this
behavior in the collective psyche of the clerics in Tehran that,
goes beyond the objectives and motives discussed earlier. The
answer may lie in the leadership's desire to establish a Unified
Middle East Theocracy centered in Tehran, a revival of the
medieval Abbasid realm. If so, certainly the United States,
Israel, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, even Syria, are not likely to
willingly accept such a realm as their future. If the ruling
clerics are serious in their intent, it will bring ultimate
disaster to themselves and to the noble Iranian nation.
C. IRAN'S OPTIONS:
Iran's options in reference to its opposition to the peace
process are limited. It can either: 1) pursue opposition at all
costs, 2) accept the verdict if it fails and seek other solutions,
or 3) join in the pursuit of peace and stability. It hardly seems
likely that (3) will be an acceptable option for the current
leaders in Tehran Therefore, we must look at options (1) and (2)
above. Option l) Pursuit of opposition to the peace process:
The most likely course for the current leadership, is
tocontinue its opposition to any settlement between Israel and
Syria until the matter is resolved to its favor ordisappoinanent
If, as the Tehran ruling clerics hope, the peace initiatives fail,
their rewards would be great but at high risk ultimately to the
nation's security and well-being. The aftarnathofthepeace
initianvefailure,islikely toembolden d -ie regime
minvokefimherYkAdlattaggressionsagainstIsael,orasindicated
earlier,tochallengetheBeirut govaTmcrntityelf Secondly, theTehtan
leadership, may avail itself the opportunity of settling the
"Israel problem" oneeand forall.Thisoould bedone through
military.mack by Syriawith financial and military support from
Iran, Libya or North Korea It is also probable that Iran could
forge a coalition/alliance with Iraq and Syriaasarrning
politicalard otherdifferenaescould be set aside fora common effort
against Israel (and perhaps Jordan in the
bagam).Thermhzatimofthisadmimdyextrer»epolitiA-military scenario
isfiaughtwithdangernotonlytoIran itsefbut,totheprospects ofa
general Middle East War with United Suites' involvement
Most assuredly, even if Syria (and Iran/Iraq) are not engaged
in waragainst Israel, increased Hezbollah attack, would bring
about an Israeli response not unlike 1982-83 incursion into
Lebanon. The consequences of such an Israeli response cannot be
guessed at now, but in any event, it could not be conducive to
regional peace and stability.
Option 2) Accept the verdict of Syrian-Israeli peace accord and
seek other solutions:
If the peace initiative succeeds, the Tehran leadership is
faced with thedilerrmaofwithdmwingentimlyfromdie
ateraof~iLtivehosflity aganst Istael,'tiek its wotuxls" of foreign
policy failure and tend to other matters. Or, as it is reasonable
to surmise, Tehran will seek a more meaningful political-military
reconciliation with Iraq directed primarily against Israel, but
with significant implications for Saudi Arabia, other Persian Gulf
States and Jordan. As far-fetched as it may seem,
theW'adaistpolitical structure in Syria nray "find itself
threatened by such an alliance. One could reasonably expect that
Tehran would employ its Hezbollah client~ against a "turn-coat"
Syriawhichmade the accord with Isael The otheraltemativewithin
this option is for it to totally withdraw fixxn
tenvristic-military
aggressiveness on its socalled' Vlrestem Flank". Such action
would bean admittance of failure to its lackeys and the world at
large. Couldthisregirresurvwethefadtueofitsheavyirn+estr
rltsofWhncal, ideolo9cal,andreligiouscapitalagainst theUnited
States, Isael,and the peace process? The answer here is difficult
to reach, since there are too many variables to consider within
the Iranian domestic environment Suffice it to say that "to lick
its wounds" and withdraw from the "Western Flank" combat
environment, is not a likely alternative for the Tehran regime as
seen from the current vantage point.
Option 3) Join the pursuit of peace and stability in the
region: Thusopnonistheleast likely thecurrentradrcalregime
wouldchoose, for all the masons, motives, and objectives
heretofore discussed. Although this istheoption that those
patrioticelementswoulddhoose for Iran, it will not be realized
until those elements achieve political power in Tehran. For this
reason, it is understandable why the authorities in Tehran have
kept much relevant information of its anti-peace activities from
the Iranian populace.
Foci ,a on Irwi, resolutely believes that no peace or stability
in the region is forthcoming from this irresponsible regime.
Furthermore, not only must all Iranians, in and out of the
country, be made aware of the (=sequences of the current regimes
opposition to the peace initiatives, but the international
community must also be informed. Because, in the unfortunate event
of war in the Middle East, many nations could be drawn into such a
conflict Bluntly put, the international community must make
itcleartotheclerical regime that it will not permit its anti-peace
activities, even if United Nations sanctions are to be employed,
among other measures if necessary.
D. CONSEQUENCES FOR IRAN'S ANTI-PEACE ACTIVITIES:
Nothing can come to Iran but economic and physical disaster for
its irresponsible anti-peace foreign policy. It is conceivable
that, should war occur, in any form or magnitude, Iran will suffer
the consequences. The "consequences" would likely range from
economic sanctions and blockade to bombing and missile attacks on
selected economic-military targets in Iran. One only needs to look
at the devastation on Baghdad, brought on by modern weapons, as to
what could befall Iran's cities and industrial centers. The end
result, tragically, is harm to the Iranian people and long term
physical and economic destruction to the nation. The final and
only true assessment of the current regime's behavior against
peace is that its modus operandi is indeed not in the interest of
the Iranian nation and its people. Simply said, it threatens the
very survival of an ancient nation.